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STATEMENT Of JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an order dismissing the
Plaintiff/Appellant's First Amended Complaint in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah by the
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis.
This Court has jurisdiction of Plaintiff/Appellant's appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF HPVIEW
1.

Is an employee prevented from bringing an action

against the employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier
for lack of good faith and fair dealing?
Standard of Review:

Correction of Error.

State Tax

Comm. v. Industrial Comm., 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984).
2.

May the District Court, in granting a motion to

dismiss, state that all of the material allegations of the
Complaint were considered true, rather than recite each
allegation of the complaint in the court's order of dismissal.
Standard of Review:

Correction of Error.

State Tax

Commission v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah
1984) .
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes and administrative rules are referred
to herein and are set out verbatim in the Addendum.
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code

Admin.
Admin.
Admin.
Admin.
Admin.
Admin.

Utah Admin. R.

§ 31A-22-1003
§ 31A-22-1004
§ 31A 22-1008
§§ 41-12a-301 to 303
§ 41-12a-102(9)
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k)
R 568-1-3E
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff/Appellant Christine Savage ("Ms. Savage") filed a
complaint against Defendant/Appellee Educators Insurance Company
("Educators") alleging, inter

alia,

bad faith adjusting of Ms.

Savage's worker's compensation claim.

(R. 2-11).

Upon

Educators' Motion to Dismiss, (R. 16-30), Ms. Savage filed her
First Amended Complaint alleging breach of contract, breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction
of severe emotional distress, tortious or bad faith conduct,
breach of fiduciary relationship, and interference with a
protected property interest.

(R. 54-65).

Educators renewed its Motion to Dismiss as to the First
Amended Complaint.

(R. 77-86).

The District Court granted

Educators' motion (R. 120-123) and issued a final order
dismissing the First Amended Complaint in its entirety, with
prejudice.

(R. 131-143).

Ms. Savage appealed to the Utah

Supreme Court, which assigned the case to this Court.
- 2-

STATEMENT OP PACTS
Educators provides Jordan School Districts workerfs
compensation insurance,1

(R.55).

Ms. Savage was an employee of

Jordan School District on January 5, 1987, when she was injured
in an accident arising out of and in the course of her
employment.

(R.55).

Three physicians recommended that Ms. Savage undergo dorsal
column stimulator treatment.

(R.55).

Educators referred Ms.

Savage to Dr. Gerald Moress for an independent medical
examination (hereinafter "IME").

(R.55).

Dr. Moress indicated

in his IME report that he knew of no further treatment for Ms.
Savage and that it was not likely that a dorsal column stimulator
treatment would relieve Ms. Savage's pain.

(R.55-56).

Based on the recommendation of Dr. Moress, Educators
informed Ms. Savage that further medical treatment would not be
covered by worker's compensation insurance, with the exception of
continued coverage for psychiatric treatment.

(R.56).

Because this appeal arises from a motion to dismiss, the
allegation in Ms. Savage's Amended Complaint that Educators
provides worker's compensation insurance for Jordan School
District is accepted as true. However, in reality Jordan School
District is self-insured and has contracted with Educators to
administer and adjust the District's worker's compensation
claims.
- 3 -

Later, in settlement of Ms, Savage's worker's compensation
claim, Educators, Ms. Savage, and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
entered a Stipulated Findings and Order.

As part of that

settlement, Educators agreed to pay for Ms. Savage's disputed
medical expenses.

(R.56).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Ms. Savage raises several issues in her brief, but discusseis
only two.

Those are (1) whether an employee may bring a cause df

action for bad faith against the employer's worker's compensation
insurance carrier, and (2) whether the District Court must recite
all allegations of the complaint in granting a motion to dismiss.
No other issue is supported in her argument, and therefore the
additional issues should not be considered on appeal.
Ms. Savage may not bring an action for bad faith against
Educators because she is not a party to the worker's compensation
insurance contract.

That contract is between Educators and the

employer, Jordan School District.

This court has already

determined that a third party claimant may not bring a bad faith
action against an insurer.

Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.

Co., 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991).

The Pixton holding was based

on the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Beck v. Farmer's Ins.
Exch.. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

The Beck court held that an

action for bad faith against an insurer is based in contract, mot
- 4 -

in tort.

Pixton held that because a third party claimant is not

a party to the insurance contract, no bad faith action is
possible.

Ms. Savage is a third party claimant, and therefore

may not bring a bad faith action against Educators.
Ms. Savage claims that workers compensation insurance is
unique because it is required by statute,

However, other

insurance, such as automobile liability insurance, is also
required by statute.

This fact did not alter the Pixton court's

decision to deny a cause of action for bad faith, where the
plaintiff had named as a defendant the liability insurer of the
driver who caused the plaintiff's injuries.
Ms. Savage asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1004
provides a statutory right for employees to bring a bad faith
action against worker's compensation insurers.

To the contrary,

that section does not create any new cause of action.

It merely

provides that worker's compensation insurance contracts shall
allow an employee to seek worker's compensation benefits directly
from the insurer.

The statute does not create or consider any

other causes of action.
Ms. Savage claims that the District Court failed to consider
all material allegations of her Amended Complaint in granting
Educator's motion to dismiss.

In reality, the District Court

specifically stated that all material allegations of a complaint
are considered.

These specific allegations of the Amended
- 5 -

Complaint which Ms. Savage claims were not considered were in
fact referred to individually by the District Court in its
written decision.

Moreover, the District Court carefully

reviewed each cause of action raised in the Amended Complaint in
its Conclusions of Law.

There is no doubt that the District

Court considered all of the material allegations of the Amended
Complaint as true. Accordingly, the judgment of the District
Court should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT
Ms. Savage's brief identifies several issues presented, but
discusses only two of them.

First, she asserts that an injured

employee who receives worker's compensation benefits should be
entitled to bring an action for bad faith against the employer's
worker's compensation insurer.

Second, Ms. Savage claims that

the District Court did not consider all of the allegations raised
in her First Amended Complaint when the court granted Educators'
Motion to Dismiss.

For the reasons stated below, Ms. Savage's

arguments are without merit, and the District Court's Order of
Dismissal should be affirmed.
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POINT I:

MS. SAVAGE MAY NOT RELY ON ISSUES NOT
SUPPORTED IN HER BRIEF

In her brief Ms. Savage has augmented the issues which she
claims must be determined to resolve this matter.

In her

Docketing Statement, dated September 30, 1992, Ms. Savage stated
at page 5 that the issues presented in her appeal were (1)
whether an injured worker receiving worker's compensation
benefits could bring "a bad faith claim against the employer's
worker's compensation insurance carrier," and (2) whether the
District Court erred in not repeating each allegation of the
Complaint in granting the Motion to Dismiss. Ms. Savage did not
identify any other issues in her docketing statement or notice of
appeal.

However, in her brief, Ms. Savage claims three

additional issues which she did not raise before.

Briefly, these

issues involve whether an employee can bring an action against
the employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier for
(1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) punitive
damages, and (3) breach of a fiduciary relationship between the
employee and the insurer.

Because these issues were not

identified in the docketing statement, they may not be raised in
the brief.

Moreover, while Ms. Savage raises these additional

issues, she fails to support them in the body of her brief.
Therefore, this Court should not consider them.

State v.

Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 1989); State v. Reiners. 803 P.2d
- 7 -

1300 (Utah App. 1990); Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 869 (Utah
App. 1991).

POINT II: AN EMPLOYEE MAY NOT BRING AN ACTION FOR BAD
FAITH AGAINST THE EMPLOYER'S WORKERfS
COMPENSATION INSURER
Ms. Savage may not bring an action for bad faith against
Educators.

She is a third party whose injury entitled her to

make a claim on Jordan School District's worker's compensation
insurance with Educators.

The contract of insurance is between

Jordan School District (the "District") and Educators.

According

to the allegations of the First Amended Complaint, the District
is the insured and Educators is the insurer.
party to the insurance contract.

Ms. Savage is not a

In other words, Ms. Savage is a

third party making a claim against an insured, the District.
That an employer is the insured under a worker's compensation
policy is made clear by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1008, which
refers twice to the employer as "the insured employer."

See full

text of statute at Addendum, p. A15. Ms. Savage now alleges that
she has an action for bad faith against the insurer, Educators.
This issue has already been addressed by the Court of Appeals in
Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App*
1991), where this Courtfs ruling was based on the Utah Supreme
Court's prior holdings in bad faith insurance claims.

- 8 -

This Court

made it clear that a third party may not bring an action for bad
faith against the insurer.
In Pixton, this Court addressed the specific issue of
whether a third party recipient of benefits from an insurance
policy may bring an action against the insurer for breach of a
duty to deal fairly and in good faith.

The Court turned to the

Utah Supreme Court's decisions and found that a third party
beneficiary may not bring an action against an insurer for bad
faith or wrongful denial of benefits.
In Pixton, this Court reviewed the Supreme Court's holding
in Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

In

Beck, the insured filed an action for bad faith against the
insurer based on a refusal to settle the insured's first party
claim for uninsured motorist benefits.

The Beck decision

determined that there is an implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing between an insurer and its insured.

The duty was not

based in tort, but on the insurance contract between the insured
and the insurer.

The Court in Pixton relied on Beck for the rule

that even in third party situations, the good faith duty requires
a contractual relationship:
The [Beck] court reasoned that such performances
were what the insured had "bargained and paid for,
and the insurer has the obligation to perform
them," or be liable for damages sustained as a
result of the breach. Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. The
Supreme Court emphasized that the duty to settle
claims in good faith is tied to the insurance
• 9 -

contract and runs to the insured. See id. at 799800. Although faced with a first-party situation,
the court in Beck also emphasized that, even in
third-party situations, "the contract itself
creates a fiduciary relationship because of the
trust and reliance placed in the insurer by the
insured." Id. at 799.
Pixton, 809 P.2d at 748.
This Court concluded that the Utah Supreme Court's prior
decisions in the area of insurer liability indicated that there
was no cause of action for bad faith or wrongful denial of
benefits by a beneficiary against an insurer.

Further, the Court

noted this was the rule followed by the great majority of
jurisdictions:
In sum, we are persuaded that there is no duty of
good faith and fair dealing imposed upon an
insurer running to a third party claimant, such as
Pixton, seeking to recover against the company's
insured. This conclusion is consistent with the
commentators and the great majority of courts in
other jurisdictions that have been confronted with
the issue. As one well-known commentator on
insurance has noted, "the duty to exercise due
care or good faith is owed to the insured and not
to a third party." 14 G. Couch, Couch on
Insurance § 51:136 (rev. 2d ed. 1982).
The majority of courts faced with the
potential existence of a duty of good faith and
fair dealing running from an insurance company to
a third party claimant seeking to recover against
the company's insured have rejected such a notion.
Pixton, 809 P.2d at 749-750.
Ms. Savage quotes the Beck decision in an attempt to argue
that worker's compensation claimants should be able to bring
- 10 -

actions in tort against the insurer.
misapplying the Beck holding.

However, Ms. Savage is

Beck held that the duties of an

insurer to its insured in a first party situation are
contractual.

Beck also allowed that outrageous conduct by an

insurer towards its insured may give rise to an action in tort in
a third party situation.

However, the duty in tort law which the

Beck court addressed extended only to the insured, not to the
third party.

As stated, that issue was addressed by the Court of

Appeals in Pixton. which held that the third party may not bring
an action for bad faith against an insurer.
The Supreme Court also refused to allow a third party to
bring an action against an insurer for bad faith in Ammerman v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 19 Utah 2d 251, 430 P.2d 576 (1967).

The

court in Ammerman indicated that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing arises "because of the policy," and is "regarded as a
separate cause of action for a wrong done to the insured by
violating a fiduciary duty owed to him."
added.)

Id.f at 578 (emphasis

The Pixton court determined by following Ammerman that

there can be no bad faith action by a third party against an
insurer because there is no contractual relationship between
them.

The insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing extends

only to the insured, with whom it entered the contract.
809 P.2d at 749-780.
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Pixton,

Ms. Savage is not a party to the insurance contract between
Educators and the District.

She is a third party with no

contractual relationship to the insurer.

Consequently, she

cannot bring an action against Educators for bad faith under this
Court's holding in Pixton.
Ms. Savage claims that worker's compensation insurance
should be an exception to the rule announced by this Court,
because it is required by statute.

However, other types of

insurance are also required by statute, yet do not warrant
special exceptions to this Court's rule requiring a contractual
relationship for a bad faith action.

Automobile owners are

required to provide certain minimum liability coverage for the
benefit of those injured by their negligence.
41-12a-301 to 303, 41-12a-102(9).

Utah Code Ann. §§

Yet that fact did not dissuade

this Court's opinion in Pixton, where the plaintiff brought her
bad faith action based on the insured's automobile liability
policy.

Pixton, 809 P.2d at 747. Therefore, it is

inconsequential that worker's compensation insurance is required
by statute.
This Court has made it clear that an action for bad faith ils
founded in contract, and that there must be a contractual
relationship for a party to bring the action.

The fact that the

insurance contract in this case is for worker's compensation
insurance does not change the fact that Ms. Savage is a third
- 12 -

party.

She benefits from the insurance policy only to the extent

that any injured person benefits from the liability insurance of
a person causing an injury.

Consequently, she should not be

allowed to pursue an action for bad faith.
Ms. Savage argues in her brief that this Court should allow
bad faith actions by worker's compensation claimants because
other jurisdictions have done so.

She cites three cases in

particular, two from Colorado, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. v.
Johnson, 821 P.2d 804 (Colo. 1991) and Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985), and one from Nevada, Falline
v. GNLV Corp.. 107 Nev. 1004, 823 P.2d 888 (Nev. 1991).

However,

these cases each find that bad faith actions arise in tort. They
do not confront the requirement of this jurisdiction that there
be a direct contractual relationship on which to base a bad faith
insurance action.2

2

While Ms. Savage declares that the Nevada court "did not
define whether it was in tort or contract," this is not accurate.
The court in Falline, supra, stated clearly that bad faith
insurance actions are brought in tort in that jurisdiction:
Consonant with our prior rulings, we hold that an
employee who has suffered damage as a result of
the negligent or bad faith failure or refusal by a
self-insured employer or its administrator/agent,
to process and timely pay claims properly asserted
under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NRS
616) may pursue a tort action in accordance with
the limitations set forth in this opinion.
Falline, 823 P.2d at 893 (emphasis added).
- 13 -

Other than the three cases discussed by Ms. Savage, she
presents a string of cases which she alleges have concluded that
there is a common law cause of action by an injured worker
against the employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier.
However, of these cases, six are based in tort rather than in
contract,

one is based on a statute specifically allowing bad

faith actions,

and one is not a worker's compensation case —

it

involves an insured bringing an action for bad faith against his
own insurer.

Clearly these cases do not alter the reasoning of

this Court in Pixton, supra.

Moreover, while some states may

allow bad faith actions, many states have denied bad faith
actions by employees against their employers' worker's
compensation insurers.6
3

West v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 846 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.
1988); Holman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir.
1983); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. v. Holland, 469 So.2d 55
(Miss. 1985); Nabors v. Travelers Ins. Co., 551 So.2d 308 (Ala.
1989); Carpentino v. Transport Ins. Co., 609 F.Supp. 556 (D.Conrt.
1985); Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615,
273 N.W.2d 220 (1979). Of note is the fact that Wisconsin's
legislature has acted to reverse by statute the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's decision in Coleman. See Messner v. Briggs & Stratton
Corp., 120 Wis.2d 127, 353 N.W. 2d 363 (Ct. App. 1984).
4

Jones v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 474 N.W.2d 18 (Minn. App.
1991).
5

Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271
N.W.2d 368 (1978).
6

See, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 469 So.2d 558 (Ala. 1985); Hixon v.
State Compensation Fund, 115 Ariz. 392, 565 P.2d 898 (App. 1977j;
Caplan v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 175 Cal.App.3d 146, 220
- 14 -

Ms. Savage also relies on Horton v. Gem State Mut., 794 P.2d
847 (Utah App. 1990), alleging that the holding in that case
provides that a bad faith claim can be asserted against an
insurance carrier.

However, the holding of that case is that an

appellant, claiming there is a lack of evidence in support of the
trial court's findings, must provide an adequate record to allow
review of the evidence.

The case is not pertinent to the matter

at hand.
Finally, Ms. Savage claims that Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1004
provides a statutory right of action by employees against
worker's compensation insurance carriers.

That section states:

All worker's compensation insurance policies shall
contain a provision that employees may enforce, in
their own names, the liability of the insurer.
Ms. Savage has misconstrued the effect of this statute.

It does

not purport to create any additional liability of the insurer.
It refers only to the liability of the insurer to provide
worker's compensation benefits according to the terms of its
policy contract with the insured employer.

This is made clear by

Cal.Rptr. 549 (2 Dist. 1985); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Whitworth,
442 So.2d 1078 (Fla.App. 1983); Bright v. Nimmo, 253 Ga. 378, 320
S.E.2d 365 (1984); Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 111.2d
441, 448 N.E.2d 866 (1983); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mitchell. 712
S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1986); Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., Inc. v.
Leone, 399 So.2d 806 (La.App.), writ denied, 401 So.2d 993 (La.
1981); Haiciar v. Crawford & Co., 142 Mich.App. 632, 369 N.W.2d
860 (1985); Young v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.. 588 S.W.2d
46 (Mo.App. 1979).
- 15 -

the companion section to Section 1004. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-221003 sets out the required coverage for worker's compensation
policies:
Every insurance policy covering the liability of
an employer under Title 35, Chapter l, shall cover all
types of worker's compensation benefits required to be
provided under that chapter . . .
(Emphasis added.)

This is the liability which may be enforced by

the employee under Section 1004. The section allows for
efficient resolution of benefit claims by enabling the employee
to name the insurer directly on the employee's application for
hearing.

The Industrial Commission's application for hearing

form specifically requests the identity of the insurer for that
purpose.

Utah Admin. R. R568-1-3E.

See Addendum, p. A22. Thus,

this section does not create any right in an employee to bring a
civil action for bad faith against an employer's worker's
compensation insurer.
It is clear under Utah law that a third party making a claim
against an insured's insurance policy may not bring an action foir
bad faith against the insurer.

The third party has no

contractual relationship contract with the insurer, and thus no
entitlement to bring the action.

Ms. Savage is precisely in this

position, and therefore may not bring her proposed action against
Educators.

Accordingly, the order of the District Court should

be affirmed.
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POINT III:

THE DISTRICT COURT CONSIDERED ALL
MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS IN GRANTING
THE MOTION TO DISMISS

Ms. Savage complains that the District Court did not
consider all of the allegations of her First Amended Complaint
when it granted Educators1 Motion to Dismiss.

This is not true.

The District Court expressly stated that "in the context of a
Motion to Dismiss, the material allegations of the complaint are
accepted as true.
(Utah 1990)."

Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622

The District Court then summarized the essence of

Ms. Savage's allegations rather than repeat them all verbatim.
Nothing in the court's decision implied that the court considered
only those allegations which were summarized.

In fact, the court

made it clear that all material allegations were considered.
This is equally clear from the court's detailed conclusions of
law in which the court carefully considered each cause of action
raised by Ms. Savage and accepted all of the allegations as true,
finding as a matter of law that Ms. Savage had failed to state a
claim.
Ms. Savage identifies certain allegations which she alleges
were not considered by the District Court. Many of the
allegations which Ms. Savage claims were omitted are legal
conclusions, not factual allegations, and therefore should not be
considered true.

Moreover, each of the "material allegations"
- 17 -

which Ms. Savage claims were omitted by the District Court were
in fact specifically included by the District Court in its
Findings and Conclusions of Law. (R. 131-136.)

Referring to the

six single-spaced, indented paragraphs included in Ms. Savage's
brief at pages 15-16, the allegations of the first paragraph were
cited by the District Court at paragraph 3 of the Findings.
133).

(R.

The allegations of Ms. Savage's second paragraph are found

at paragraph 10 of the Findings.

(R. 135). The allegations of

Ms. Savage's third paragraph are found at paragraph's 5 and 9 of
the Findings.

(R. 133f 135). The allegations of Mr. Savage's

fourth paragraph are found at paragraphs 3 and 9 of the Findings+
(R. 133, 135). The allegations of Ms. Savage's fifth paragraph
are found at paragraph 11 of the Findings.

(R. 135). Finally,

the allegations of Ms. Savage's sixth paragraph are found at
paragraph 12 of the Findings. (R. 135-136).
The allegations allegedly omitted by the District Court
were, to the contrary, specifically included.

The District Court

specifically stated that all material allegations of the Amended
Complaint were considered true. Moreover, the District Court
carefully reviewed each cause of action raised in the Amended
Complaint in its Conclusions of Law.

There is no doubt that the

District Court considered all material allegations of the Amended
Complaint as true.

Consequently there is no error and no harm to

Ms. Savage.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Savage is not entitled to bring an action for bad faith
against Educators because she has no contractual relationship
with Educators.

She is a third party, not the insured.

issue has already been ruled upon by this Court.

This

In addition,

Ms. Savage is simply mistaken when she alleges that the District
Court failed to consider all of the material allegations of the
First Amended Complaint.

The District Court did in fact

expressly consider each material allegation.

This fact is also

evidenced by the detailed examination the District Court gave to
each cause of action raised by Ms. Savage.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court should be
affirmed by this Court.
DATED this

\\o

day of February, 1993.

Respectfully Submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN

4

Samuel D. Mcvey
Stuart F. Weed
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Stuart F. Weed, certify that on February

1993 I

served four copies of the attached BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
upon John Preston Creer, counsel for the appellant, in this
matter by mailing them to him by first class mail with sufficient
postage prepaid to the following address:

John Preston Creer
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Samuel D. McVey
Stuart F. Weed
Attorneys of Record
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RIF.9 !»S7B3£T COURT
jhi' - •'.<•:;od District

AUG 1 4 1992
By-fc-^.

Deputy Cierk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAT CHRISTINE SAVAGE
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 920901786

EDUCATORS INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,

Judge Leslie A Lewis

Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant.
Plaintiff Christine Savage filed the original complaint in this matter, after which defendant
Educator's Insurance Company filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. In response,
Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint, which defendant then included in its motion
to dismiss. The First Amended Complaint alleged breach of contract as the first cause of
action, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing as the second cause of action,

intentional infliction of severe emotional distress as the third cause of action, tortious or
bad faith conduct in dealing with plaintiff in the second, third and fourth causes of action,
breach of fiduciary relationship in the fifth cause of action, and interference with a
protected property interest in the sixth cause of action. Plaintiff also alleged entitlement
to punitive damages.
The Court has received the defendant's motion to dismiss and memorandum in
support thereof. The Court has also received the plaintiffs memorandum in opposition
and defendant's reply to plaintiffs memorandum. The matter was submitted for decision
and was argued before the Court on July 17, 1992. Plaintiff was represented by her
attorney, John Preston Creer. Defendant was represented by its attorney, Samuel D.
McVey. The Court has now reviewed the defendant's motion to dismiss and the
memoranda filed by both parties and has carefully considered the arguments of counsel.
Being fully advised, the Court makes the following findings and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS
In the context of a motion to dismiss, the material allegations of the complaint are
accepted as true. Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). The
following findings and allegations are taken from the plaintiffs first amended complaint.
1. Plaintiff was employed by Jordan School District when she sustained personal
injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment. (First Amended Complaint,
111 2, 5, and 6.)
-2-

2. At the time of plaintiffs injury, defendant was the workers' compensation
insurance carrier for Jordan School District. Defendant had entered into a contract with
Jordan School District to provide such insurance. (First Amended Complaint, UK 3, 12.)
3. Plaintiff underwent surgery and treatment for her injuries, but still suffered from
extreme lower back pain. Three physicians recommended that she have a dorsal column
stimulator treatment. (First Amended Complaint, Ml 6 and 7.)
4. Defendant referred plaintiff to Dr. Gerald Moress for an independent medical
evaluation (hereinafter "IME"). Dr. Moress provided a written opinion that he knew of no
further medical treatment for the plaintiffs condition. He was also of the opinion that it
was not likely that a dorsal column stimulator treatment would relieve the plaintiffs pain.
(First Amended Complaint, 11 8.)
5. Based on Dr. Moress' opinion, defendant informed plaintiff that no future
medical expenses would be covered by workers' compensation insurance, including the
dorsal column stimulator. Defendant did continue to provide coverage for psychiatric care.
This occurred on March 6, 1991. (First Amended Complaint, 11 9.)
6. On or about December 2, 1991, defendant entered into a stipulated findings and
order in case No. B91000577 before the Industrial Commission of Utah which was
plaintiffs workers' compensation claim arising out of her industrial injury. In the
stipulation and order, defendant stipulated that it would pay all of plaintiffs medical
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expenses arising out of her industrial injury, including the dorsal column stimulator
treatment. (First Amended Complaint, 1f 10.)
7. The workers' compensation insurance contract between defendant and Jordan
School district required defendant to pay all reasonable and necessary medical expenses
incurred by plaintiff as the result of accidents or injuries sustained while working for
Jordan School District. Plaintiff suffered an industrial accident and defendant refused to
pay for certain medical expenses arising out of the accident. Plaintiff alleges that this
refusal was a breach of the workers' compensation insurance contract, thus causing damage
to the plaintiff. (First Amended Complaint,
!H 14-18.)
8. Plaintiff alleges that defendant breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing in
denying plaintiffs request for certain medical benefits under the workers' compensation
policy. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant acted wrongfully and unreasonably by failing
and refusing to make an adequate investigation prior to withholding approval for the
dorsal column stimulator treatment, by refusing to give reasonable interpretation to the
provisions of the workers' compensation insurance policy, by acting to protect defendant's
own financial interest at the expense of the plaintiffs rights, by failing to provide plaintiff
any reasonable or justifiable basis for denying plaintiff's request for a dorsal column
stimulator and by forcing plaintiff to engage legal counsel and initiate litigation. Plaintiff
also alleges that defendant breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to
-4-

administer plaintiffs claim for workers' compensation benefits in compliance with Utah
Code Annotated § 31A-26-303(3)(h). (First Amended Complaint, H 20.)
9. Plaintiff alleges that defendant intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress on
the plaintiff by using Dr. Moress' IME report as a basis to terminate plaintiffs workers'
compensation benefits. Plaintiff alleges that such reliance on Dr. Moress' report was not
sufficient cause for such termination of benefits. (First Amended Complaint, 11 25.)
10. Also in support of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
plaintiff alleges that defendant was aware that Dr. Moress would provide a conservative
medical opinion and that there was a strong likelihood that his opinion would not be
favorable to plaintiff. (First Amended Complaint, 1 26.)
11. Plaintiff alleges that defendant engaged in a tortious course of conduct by using
Dr. Moress for an IME evaluation, knowing that his opinions favor the insurance company
rather than being fair, balanced, medically sound and accurate. (First Amended
Complaint, K 33.) Plaintiff alleges that the defendants should have known that the plaintiff
and others similarly situated would be damaged through their use of Dr. Moress as an
IME physician. (First Amended Complaint, 11 34.)
12. Plaintiff alleges a breach of a fiduciary relationship between the defendant and
the plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that the defendant, by issuing the workers' compensation
insurance policy to Jordan School District and accepting premiums, agreed and promised
that if plaintiff incurred covered medical expenses that the duty of the defendant to pay
-5*

such benefits would arise. Plaintiff alleges that once plaintiff and plaintiffs doctor
requested a dorsal column stimulator, such request gave rise to a duty to approve the
requested treatment and pay the benefits associated therewith. After the duty to pay
benefits arose, plaintiff asserts that such benefits were no longer the property of the
defendant but were held by the defendant for the sole benefit and use of the plaintiff,
thereby creating afiduciaryrelationship between defendant and plaintiff. Plaintiff claims
that this duty was breached when the medical treatment was not approved. (First
Amended Complaint, 1M 39-42.)
13. Plaintiff alleges that defendant knew that plaintiff was relying on the financial
assistance from the benefits provided under the workers' compensation insurance policy
and that plaintiff had a protected property interest in such benefits. Plaintiff alleges that
defendant intentionally and willfully interfered with this protected property interest in
denying plaintiff the opportunity to have the dorsal column stimulator treatment. (First
Amended Complaint, 11 44.)
14. Plaintiff also alleged throughout the complaint that defendant's conduct was
willful, malicious, knowing, and reckless, thus entitling plaintiff to punitive damages.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiffs first cause of action alleges that defendant entered a contract with
plaintiffs former employer Jordan School District (the "District") to provide workers'
compensation benefits including reasonable and necessary medical expenses arising out of
-6-

industrial accidents. Plaintiff alleges that defendant breached that contract by not
providing certain medical benefits she requested. The determination of whether medical
treatment is reasonable and necessary is one to be made exclusively by the Industrial
Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 35-1-60. This section provides that the
workers' compensation remedy is the exclusive remedy for employees injured in the course
of their employment.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this
Title for injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not,
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and . . . the liabilities of
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee . . . and
no action at law may be maintained against an employer, or against any
officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury
or death of an employee.
The Workmen's Compensation Act provides specific procedures to follow in the
event an employee is dissatisfied with medical benefits provided by the insurance carrier.
The proper course is to file an application for hearing with the Industrial Commission or
request other Industrial Commission review. It is not proper to seek review of such
matters in District Court. Plaintiff has alleged in this cause of action that she was not
provided with medical benefits which were reasonable and necessary. That determination
must be addressed by the Industrial Commission, and not by this Court. Therefore, the
plaintiffs first cause of action for breach of contract is dismissed with prejudice.
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Plaintiffs second cause of action alleges that defendant breached a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing owed to plaintiff. Plaintiff has also alleged tortious or bad faith
conduct in defendant's dealing with plaintiff in her second, third and fourth causes of
action. The Utah courts have made it clear that only an insured can bring an action of
bad faith or wrongful denial against its insurer. In Pixton v. State Farm. 809 P.2d 746
(Utah App. 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals addressed the specific issue of whether a
beneficiary of an insurance policy can bring an action against the insurer for breach of a
duty to deal fairly and in good faith. The Court found that the Utah Supreme Court's
prior decisions in the area of insurance carrier liability indicated that there was no cause
of action for bad faith or wrongful denial of benefits by a beneficiary against an insurer.
In sum, we a persuaded that there is no duty of good faith and fair
dealing imposed upon an insurer running to a third party claimant, such as
Pixton, seeking to recover against the company's insured. This conclusion is
consistent with the commentators and the great majority of courts in other
jurisdictions that have been confronted with the issue. As one well known
commentator on insurance law noted, "the duty to exercise due care or good
faith is owed to the insured and not to a third party." 14G Couch on
Insurance section 51:136 (Rev. 2d Ed. 1982).
The majority of courts faced with the potential existence of a duty of
good faith and fair dealing running from an insurance company to a third
party claimant seeking to recover against the company's insured have rejected
such a notion.
809 P.2d at 749-750.
The Supreme Court of Utah has also indicated that no bad faith action can be
brought where there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant
-8&Q

insurer. Auerbach Company v. Key Security Policy. Inc., 680 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984). A
contract of insurance is between the insurer and the insured, not the insurer and a third
party claimant.
Plaintiff has alleged in her amended complaint that she is a beneficiary to a
contract of insurance between defendant and Jordan School District. She has alleged that
the insurance contract was between defendant and the District. The Plaintiff in this action
is a third party, and is not a party to the contract of insurance between defendant and the
District. She is therefore not entitled to raise claims of tortious or bad faith conduct, or
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Therefore, the second, third and fourth
causes of action are dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs third cause of action alleges intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress because the defendant terminated medical benefits based on an independent
medical examination report of Dr. Gerald Moress. Plaintiff alleges that defendant sent
plaintiff to Dr. Moress for the examination, and that defendant knew that Dr. Moress
would provide a conservative medical opinion and that there was a strong likelihood that
his opinion would not be favorable to plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that defendant's reliance
on Dr. Moress' report in terminating benefits was intentional, unjustified, and caused her
severe emotional distress.
It is proper and indicative of good faith conduct for an insurer to rely on an
expert's opinion in administering a claim or in defending an uncertain claim. The Court of
-9-

Appeals has held that an insurer is entitled to rely on an expert's opinion. Callioux v.
Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 1987). Moreover, an insurer is permitted to
assert its rights to defend against uncertain claims.
Undoubtedly an insurance company is privileged, in pursuing its own
economic interests, to assert in a permissible way its legal rights and to
communicate its position in good faith to its insured even though it is
substantially certain that in so doing emotional distress will be caused. (Rest.
2d Torts, section 468 com. G and illus. 14; cf. Rest. Torts, section 773; and
see generally Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), 'Privilege/ pp. 99-100.)
Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co.. 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Cal. App. 1970).
Defendant was entitled to assert its legal rights, to defend against uncertain claims and to
process the plaintiffs claim for additional medical benefits according to the opinion of its
medical expert. Therefor, plaintiffs third cause of action for intentional infliction of severe
emotional distress is not viable under these factual allegations, and is legally insufficient.
The third cause of action is dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff has alleged entitlement to punitive damages. All of plaintiffs claims are in
contract. Allegations of a breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing are contractual in
nature. Punitive damages are not recoverable under contract claims. Canyon Country
Store v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). Therefore, plaintiffs claims for punitive
damages are dismissed with prejudice.
The fourth cause of action alleges that defendant engaged in a tortious course of
conduct by using Dr. Gerald Moress for plaintiffs independent medical examination,
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allegedly knowing that his opinions favor the insurance company rather than being "fair,
balanced, medically sound and accurate," However, the defendant was entitled by law to
select any physician it desired to perform an independent medical examination:
. . . The defendant may also require the applicant to submit to an
independent medical examination to be conducted by a physician of the
defendant's choice. Failure of an applicant to comply with such requests may
result in the dismissal of a claim or a delay in the scheduling of a hearing.
Utah Admin. Rules, R568-1-4(H), (formerly R490-1-4(H)). The Industrial Commission
rule specifically provides that the defendant in a workers' compensation action may choose
any physician to perform an examination. Therefore, the plaintiffs cause of action
regarding the defendant's selection of a physician to perform an independent medical
examination is insufficient as a matter of law, and is dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs fifth cause of action alleges that defendant breached a fiduciary
relationship with the plaintiff by failing to provide certain medical treatment when the
treatment was requested by plaintiff. For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs fifth cause
of action for breach of fiduciary relationship fails, and is dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs sixth cause of action alleges that defendant interfered with plaintiffs
protected property interest by denying coverage for certain medical benefits when
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requested by the plaintiff. For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs sixth cause of action
for interference with a protected property interest fails, and is dismissed with prejudice.
Dated this /yd^ToFAugust, 1992.

Leslie A. Lewis
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

John Preston Creer
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Samuel D. McVey (A4083)
Stuart F. Weed (A5557)
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAT CHRISTINE SAVAGE
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 920901786

EDUCATORS INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendant.
Based upon the Findings and Conclusions of Law entered by the Court in this
matter, it is hereby ORDERED that the plaintiffs First Amended Complaint be and
hereby is DISMISSED in its entirety, WITH PREJUDICE.
Dated this / ^ day of August, 1992.
BY THE/COURT

Leslie A. Lewis
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:
John Preston Creer

Form ooi Revised 3/91

Industrial Commission of Utah
Industrial Accidents Division
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 510250
S.L.C., UT 84151-0250
NOTE: PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT IN WJVCK INK

Applicant (Employee)

'Hit* Inilusin.tl ( ointiiissKiii h , | S
(lie lollowmi; <!<>< tmiriWs <»n hl<
Mrriii.il
{]
Kniplciyci Krpoil
|]
1*11 si I'.iVMtt'lil Kcpoit
lJ
('opif's ol llir .IIMIM tliM iinicijls
will IM* pinvitlrd upon iripirsl

*
*

Maiden Name and/or Other Name(s) Used

*

APPLICATION FOR HEARING
Employer

*

Employers Street Address

*

Employer s Insurance Carrier

*

APPLICANT ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE :*.r>:
1. I sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course ol employment vvilh Defendant (employe!)
on the

day of

, 19

.at t he lollowing local ion: ((Uvciuunc ft. complete

address or nearest junction, mile marker, etc.)
2. The accident occurred as follows: (Describeaccident

and resulting injuries (B(xlypart(s) injwed)

3. The injury caused temporary total disability from

to
Date first oil'
\)<iic returned
4. I have received compensation as follows: (Indicate the last paid amounts you received (weekly or monthly) and
the last payment date.)
5. This Claim is filed because: (Please mark an X in the appropriate space(s))
A.
Unpaid Medical Expenses
F.
Permanent Total Compensation
B.
Recommended Medical Care
G.
Travel Expenses
C.
Temporary Total Compensation
H.
Interest
D.
Temporary Partial Compensation
I.
Other (specify)
E.
Permanent Partial Compensation
.
6. IN ADDITION, THE CLAIMANT ALLEGES: (Please fill in or mark appropriate blank)
My date of birth is

. At the time of injury my wage was $

(per hour: day:

week: month: or other (if other, specify method of payment) and I was working
I

was /

was not married and had

hours per week.

children underage independent on me loi support.

Date
Printed Name of Applicant
Printed Name of Attorney

Signature ol Applicant

Signature of Attorney

Street Address ol Applicant

Street Address & Office # of Attorney

City / State / Zip of Applicant

City / State / Zip

/

Telephone

Applicants Telephone

/

Social Security #

PARTX
WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE
CONTRACTS
31A-22-1001. Obligation to write workers compensation
insurance.
The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah shall write all workers' compensation insurance for which application is made to the Workers' Compensation
Fund of Utah. This requirement does not apply to any other insurer.
History: C. 1953,31A-22-1001, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 183.

Cross-References. — Workers' compensation, Chapter 1 of Title 35.

31A-22-1002. Duration of coverage.
(1) Any insurer assuming a workers' compensation risk shall carry it until
the policy is canceled, either:
(a) by agreement between the Industrial Commission, the insurer, and
the employer; or
(b) after 30 days notice by the insurer to the employer, and after notice
to the Industrial Commission as provided in Section 35-1-47.
(2) The provisions of Subsection (1) do not affect the requirements of Section 31A-22-1001.
History: C. 1953,31A-22-1002, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 184;
1986, ch. 211, § 2; 1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
t

Entitlement to workers compensation.
—Partner.
Notice of cancellation.
—Effect of untimeliness.
Entitlement to workers' compensation.
Partner.
An employer was not entitled to workers'
compensation as a partner when, in fact, he
was not a partner, even though the State Insurance Fund had endorsed his insurance policy by including him as a partner and the fund
had not taken either of the two statutory alter-

natives allowing it to cancel the policy. Commission of Fin. v. Industrial Comm'n, 12 Utah
2d 415 367 p 2d 455 (1962)
Notice of cancellation.
—Effect of untimeliness.
N o t i c e o f cancellation for nonpayment of premium mailed twelve days before the policy was
to be canceled according to the notice did not
comply with requirement of 30 days' notice and
therefore was ineffective for purpose of canceling policy at any time. Employers Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 20 Utah 2d 192,
436 P.2d 228 (1968).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 81 Am. Jur. 2d Workmen's
Compensation § 662.
C.J.S. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation § 353(1).

Key Numbers. — Workmen's Compensation *» 1045.

31A-22-1003. Comprehensive coverage.
Every insurance policy covering the liability of an employer under Chapter
1, Title 35, shall cover all types of workers compensation benefits required to
be provided under that chapter. This section does not preclude primary and
excess coverage being provided under different contracts.
History: C. 1953,31A-22-1003, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1987, ch. 91, § 57.

Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted 'Title 35" for "title 53."

31A-22-1004

INSURANCE CODE

31A-22-1004. Direct enforcement by employees.
All workers compensation insurance policies shall contain a provision that
employees may enforce, in their own names, the liability of the insurer.
History: C. 1953,31A-22-1004, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27.

31A-22-1005. Payment as bar to recovery.
Payment of compensation under a workers compensation insurance policy,
whether in whole or in part, by either the employer or the insurer, bars
recovery by the employee or his dependents to the extent of the payment.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-1005, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27.

31A-22-1006. Insurer's constructive knowledge.
Every workers compensation policy or contract shall contain a provision
that, as between the employee and the insurer, notice to or knowledge of the
occurrence of the injury on the part of the employer is considered to be notice
or knowledge to the insurer. This provision shall also state that the insurer is
bound by and subject to the orders, findings, decisions, and awards rendered
against the employer for the payment of compensation on account of compensable accidental injuries or occupational disease disability.
History: C. 1953,31A-22-1006, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27.

31A-22-1007. Employer's insolvency.
Every workers compensation policy or contract shall contain a provision
that the insolvency of the employer and his discharge does not relieve the
insurer from the payment of compensation for injuries or death sustained by
an employee during the life of that policy or contract.
History. C. 1953,31A-22-1007, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27.

31A-22-1008. Employer's breach of safety rules.
No condition in a workers compensation policy requiring the insured employer to comply with certain safety rules may excuse the workers compensation insurer from paying the required benefits to an employee injured as a
result of the employer's breach of a safety rule that is a condition to the
workers compensation policy. However, the insurer may bring a claim against
the insured employer for breach of the policy condition.
History: C. 1953,31A-22-1008, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27.

31A-22-1009. Other applicable provisions.
Workers compensation insurance contracts are subject to any applicable
requirements of Chapter 1, Title 35.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-1009, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27.

MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

41-12a-301

PART III
OWNER'S OR OPERATOR'S SECURITY
REQUIREMENT
41-12a-301. Requirement of owner's or operator's security
— Exceptions for off-highway vehicles and offhighway implements of husbandry.
(1) Every resident owner of a motor vehicle shall maintain owner's or operator's security in effect throughout the registration period of the motor vehicle.
(2) Every nonresident owner of a motor vehicle which has been physically
present in this state for more than 90 days during the preceding 365 days
shall thereafter maintain owner's or operator's security in effect continuously
throughout the period the motor vehicle remains within Utah.
(3) The state of Utah and all of its political subdivisions and their respective departments, institutions, or agencies shall maintain owner's or operator's security in effect continuously in respect to their motor vehicles. Any
other state is considered to be a nonresident owner of its motor vehicles and is
subject to Subsection (2).
(4) The United States or any political subdivision of it, or any of its agencies, may maintain owner's or operator's security in effect in respect to their
motor vehicles.
(5) Owner's or operator's security is not required for:
(a) off-highway vehicles registered under Section 41-22-3 when operated either:
(i) on a highway designated as open for off-highway vehicle use; or
(ii) in the manner prescribed by Section 41-22-10.3; or
(b) off-highway implements of husbandry operated in the manner prescribed by Subsections 41-22-5.5(3) through (5).
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-301, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; L. 1987, ch. 162, § 29.

Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment added Subsection (5).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Liability of county.
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own vehides operated by permissive users, under for-

mer law. See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 712
P.2d 224 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobile
and Highway Traffic § 156 et seq.

C.J.S. — 60 C J . S . Motor Vehicles § 160;
60A CJ.S. Motor Vehicles § 248.
Key Numbers. — Automobiles «=» 144, 147.
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41-12a-302

MOTOR VEHICLES

41-12a-302. Operating motor vehicle without owner's or
operator's security.
Any owner of a motor vehicle on which owner's or operator's security is
required under Section 41-12a-301, who operates his vehicle or permits it to
be operated on a public highway in this state without owner's security being
in effect is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Any other person who operates
the motor vehicle upon a public highway in Utah with the knowledge that the
owner does not have owner's security in effect is also guilty of a class B
misdemeanor, unless that person has owner's security on a Utah-registered
car or its equivalent in effect which covers the operation, by him, of the motor
vehicle in question.
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-302, e n a c t e d by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; L. 1987, ch. 92, § 56.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment corrected a misspelling.

Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

2a-303, Condition to obtaining registration, license
plates, or safety inspection.
The owner of a motor vehicle required to maintain owner's security under
Section 41-12a-301 may be required to swear or affirm, in writing, or present
other reasonable evidence that he has owner's security in effect at the time of
registering, obtaining license plates for, or a safety inspection of the motor
vehicle.
History: C. 1953, 4M2a-303, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48.
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CHAPTER 12a
MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Part I
General Provisions
Section
41-12a-103.

Definitions.
Part; IV

Proof of Owner's or Operator's Security
41-12a-401
41-12a-405.
41-12a-407

Means of providing proof of
owner's or operator's security.
Surety bond as proof of owner's
or operator's security.
Certificate of self-funded cover
age as proof of owner's or operator's security.

Section
41-12a-412.

Proof of owner's or operator's
security required to preserve
registration.

Part V
Post-Accident Security Requirements
and Satisfaction of Judgments
41-12a-501. Post-accident security.
41-12a-505. Effect upon nonresident of use
of state highways.
Part VI
Miscellaneous Enforcement Provisions
41-12a-603. Operating motor vehicle without license or registration.

PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
41-12a-103« Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Department" means the Department of Public Safety.
(2) "Judgment" means any judgment which is final by expiration without appeal of the time within which an appeal might have been perfected,
or by final affirmation on appeal, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction of any state or of the United States, upon a cause of action arising
out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle, for damages, including damages for care and loss of services, because of bodily
injury to or death of any person, or because of injury to or destruction of
property including the loss of use thereof, or upon a cause of action on an
agreement of settlement for such damages.
(3) "License" or "license certificate" have the ,•': jme niiviniiigs as under
Section 41-2-102.
(4) "Motor vehicle" means every self-propelled vehicle which is designed for use upon a highway, including trailers and semitrailers designed for use with such vehicles, except traction engines, road rollers,
farm tractors, tractor cranes, power shovels, and well drillers, and every
vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead wires
but not operated upon rails.
(5) "Nonresident" means every person who is not a resident of Utah.
(6) "Nonresident's operating privilege" means the privilege conferred
upon a person who is not a resident of Utah by the laws of Utah pertaining to the operation by him of a motor vehicle, or the use of a motor
vehicle owned by him, in Utah

A19

41-12a-103

MOTOR VEHin.FlK

(7) "Operator" means every person who is in actual physical control of
a motor vehicle.
(8) "Owner" means a person who holds legal title to a motor vehicle, is
a lessee in possession, or if a motor vehicle is the subject of a conditional
sale or lease with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession
in the conditional vendee or lessee, or is the subject of a mortgage with
the mortgagor entitled to possession, then the conditional vendee, lessee,
or mortgagor is considered to be the owner for the purposes of this chapter",
(9) "Owner's or operator's security," "owner's security," or "operator's
security" means any of the following:
(a) an insurance policy or combination of policies conforming to
Section 31A-22-302 which is issued by an insurer authorized to do
business in Utah;
(b) a surety bond issued by an insurer authorized to do a surety
business in Utah in which the surety is subject to the minimum
coverage limits and other requirements of policies conforming to Section 31A-22-302, which names the department as a creditor under the
bond for the use of persons entitled to the proceeds of the bond;
(c) a deposit with the state treasurer of cash or securities complying with Section 41-12a-406;
,
(d) maintaining a certificate of seif-fiiniietl' >UN
rru^t: under Section
41-12a-407;
(e) a policy conforming to Section 31A-22-302 issued by the Risk
Management Fund created in Section 63-1-47.
(10) "Registration" means the issuance of the certificates and registration plates issued under the laws of Utah pertaining to the registration of
motor vehicles.
(11) "Self insurance" has the same meaning as provided in Section
31A-1-301.
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-103, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1987, ch. 137, § 73;
1991, ch. 203, § I.

Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added Subsections (9)(e) and (11) and made related changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v
United States, 728 F Supp. 651 (D. Utah
1989).
mU.AL'KKAI. REFERENCES
A.L.R. — What constitutes "entering" or
"alighting from" vehicle within meaning of insurance policy, or statute mandating insurance
coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149.

State regulation of motor vehicle rental
("you-drive") business, 60 A L.R.4th 784.

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including junsdid it »i •
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of poll Lit"ii subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12,l;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons except in cases involving a
first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction,
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12,

Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsection (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsections (2)(h) through 0') as Subsections (2)(i)
through (k).

R490. Industrial Coimrission, Industrial Accidents,
R490-1. Workers1 Compensation Rules - Procedures.
R490-1-1. Definitions,
A
"Commission" - means the Industria1 Commission of Utah.
B. "Applicant/Plaintiff" - means an injured employee or his/her
dependent(s) or any person seeking relief or claiming benefits under the
Workers1 Compensation and/or Occupational Disease and Disability Laws.
C. "Defendant" - means an employer, insurance carrier, self-insurer,
the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund, and/or the Uninsured Employers1 Fund.
D. "Administrative Law Judge" - means a person duly designated by the
Industrial Commission to hear and determine disputed or other cases under the
provisions of Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, and of Title 63, Chapter 46b, l!X A
E. "Insurance Carrier" - includes all insurance companies writing
workers1 compensation and occupational disease and disability insurance, the
Workers1 Compensation Fund, and self-insurers who are granted self-insuring
privileges by the Industrial Commission. In all cases involving no insurance
coverage by the employer, the term "Insurance Carrier" includes the employer.
F. "Medical Panel" - means a panel appointed by the Commission pursuant
to the standards set forth in Sections 35-1-77 and 35-2-56, U.C.A., which is
responsible to make findings regarding disputed medical aspects of a
compensation claim, and may make any additional findings, perform any tests,
or make any inquiry as the Commission may require.
G
"Award" - means the finding or decision of the Commission or
Administrative Law Judge as to the amount of compensation or benefits due any
injured employee or the dependent(s) of a deceased employee.
Authority.
*- y-r: rule is being en«i« tfH
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35-^R490-1-3. Official Forms.
A. "Employer's First Report o. mjuiy
- rorm 122" - 1his form is used
for reporting accidents, injuries, or occupational diseases as per Section
35-1-97, U.C.A. This form must be filed within seven days of the occurrence
of the alleged industrial accident or the employer's first knowledge or
notification of the same. This form also serves as OSHA Form 101.
B. "Physician's Initial Report of Work Injury or Occupational Disease
Form 123" - This form is used by all medical practitioners to report th^ir
initial treatment of an injured employee,
C. "Chiropractor's Supplemental Report - Form 124" - This form is to be
filed with the insurance carrier or self-insurer after each 15 treatments
administered by the chiropractic physician.
D. "Statement of Insurance Carrier or Self-Insurer with Respect to
Payment of Benefits - Form 141" - This form is used for reporting the initial
benefits paid to an injured employee. This form must be filed with or mailed
to the Industrial Commission on the same date the first payment of
compensation is mailed to the employee. A copy of this form must accompany
the first payment.
E. "Statement of Insurance Carrier or Self-Insurer with Respect to
Discontinuance of Benefits - Form 142" - This form is to be used by insurance
carriers or self-insured employers to notify an employee of the discontinuance
of weekly compensation benefits. The form must be mailed to the employee and

filed with the Commission five days before the date compen reason.
F. "Application for Hearing - Form 001" - Used by an applicant for
instituting an industrial claim against an insurance carrier, self-insured
employer, or uninsured employer. This form, obtainable from the Industrial
Commission, must be filed and signed by t h e injured employee or his/her agent.
All blanks must be completed to the best knowledge, belief, or information of
the injured employee.
G. "Claim f o r Protection of Rights - Form 0 0 2 " - Used by an injured
employee f o r the sole purpose of protecting his/her rights even though a
dispute does not exist. Copies are forwarded to all parties concerned. NOTE:
THIS FORM DOES NOT NEED TO BE FILED WHEN ANY OTHER APPLICATION HAS BEEN FILED.
H. Claim f o r Dependents 1 Benefits and/or Burial Benefits - Form 025" This form is used by the dependent(s) of a deceased employee to seek benefits
as a result of a fatal accident occurring in the course of employment.
I, This form must be filed before a hearing or an award is made, and
pleadings will not be accepted in lieu thereof. If pleadings are submitted,
the'attorney so filing will be supplied the form for filing before any
proceedings are initiated.
2
T h e filing of this for m by t! le surv iving spouse on behalf o? the
surviving spouse and the surviving spouse's dependent minor children s
sufficient f o r all dependents.
3. Unless otherwise directed by an Administrative 1 aw Judge, the
* owing information shall be supplied before an Order or an Award is made:
(a) A certified copy of the marriage license and birth certificates of
dependent minor children. If such evidence is not readily available, the
Commission will determine the adequacy of substitute evidence.
(b) Adoption papers or other decrees of courts of record establishing
legal responsibility for support of dependent children.
(c) If either the deceased employee or surviving spouse has been
involved in divorce proceedings, copies of decrees and orders of the court
should be supplied.
I. "Occupational Disease Claim of Employee - Form 026"
This form is
used by an employee claiming benefits under the Occupational Disease
Disability Act.
J. "Occupational Disease Claim of Dependent - Form 027" - This form is
used by the dependent(s) of a deceased employee who died as a result of an
occupational disease. All provisions of Section G above apply equally t*n 'hi*
form
.K. "Insurance Company's and Self-Insurer's Final Report of Injur} ami
Statement of Total Losses - Form 130" - This form is used by insurance
carriers and self-insurers to report the total losses occurring in a claim for
any benefits. This form must be filed as soon as final settlement is made but
in no event more than 30 days from such settlement. This form shall be filed
for all losses including medical only, compensation, survivor benefits, or any
combination of all so as to provide complete loss information for each claim.
L. "Dependents1 Benefit Order - Form 151" - This form is used by the
Commission in all accidental death cases where no issue of liability for the
death or establishment of dependency is raised and only one household of
dependents is involved. The carrier indicates acceptance of liability by
completing the top half of the form and filing it with the Commission.
M. "Medical Information Authorization - Form 046" - This form is used

